Meeting the Agency Burden Under the Confidential Source Exemption to the Freedom of Information Act by Bigelow, Judith A.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 60 Number 4 
9-1-1985 
Meeting the Agency Burden Under the Confidential Source 
Exemption to the Freedom of Information Act 
Judith A. Bigelow 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Judith A. Bigelow, Comment, Meeting the Agency Burden Under the Confidential Source Exemption to the 
Freedom of Information Act, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 873 (1985). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol60/iss4/14 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
MEETING THE AGENCY BURDEN UNDER THE
CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE EXEMPTION TO THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)1 opens government records for
public scrutiny. The Act allows concerned citizens to obtain information
about the actions of public officials and administrative agencies. Citizens
can use this information to assure the efficiency and legality of government
conduct. 2
Although the FOIA generally requires complete disclosure, release of
some government information could interfere with important policy goals.
For example, society's interest in encouraging individuals to volunteer
information to law enforcement agencies requires agencies to protect the
identities of informers. Congress enacted exemption 7(D) of the FOIA to
prevent disclosure of the identities of law enforcement confidential sources
and the information acquired from them.3
The FOIA provides that an agency invoking one of its exemptions bears
the burden of demonstrating that the exemption applies. 4 Courts construing
exemption 7(D) have struggled with the question of what evidence an
agency must present to meet this burden. The federal courts of appeals have
developed three different approaches to the problem of proving that infor-
mation came from a confidential source. 5
This Comment analyzes the approaches of the courts of appeals to the
confidential source exemption. First, the Comment presents a brief history
of the Freedom of Information Act and the development of exemption 7(D)
in Congress and the courts. The Comment explains and criticizes the con-
flicting judicial treatment of the agency's burden under the exemption. Fi-
nally, the Comment proposes a uniform approach to the agency burden that
is consistent with the policies underlying both the Act and the exemption.
I. HISTORY OF THE FOIA AND EXEMPTION 7(D)
The FOIA is a congressional commitment to make government informa-
tion available to the public. This commitment is based upon the theory that
1. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1982)) [hereinafter cited as FOIA].
2. 120 CONG. REc. 17,016 (1974) (remarks of Senator Kennedy).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (1982). The FOIA does not apply to law enforcement investigatory
records to the extent that these records: "(D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the
case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal
investigation. . . confidential information furnished only by the confidential source."
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982).
5. See infra part H.
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an open government is more responsive and responsible to the public. 6 The
Watergate scandal and abuses of law enforcement authority in domestic
intelligence investigations demonstrated that secrecy is the "incubator for
corruption. "7
Under the FOIA the federal government must promptly release all
requested records. 8 Congress recognized, however, that complete dis-
closure is not always appropriate 9 and it therefore enacted exemptions to
cover situations where disclosure would be against society's interests. 10
Balancing the FOIA policy of maximum disclosure against the need to
protect law enforcement confidentiality has raised important policy issues
in Congress and the federal courts. Investigatory files of law enforcement
agencies were not a major concern to the drafters of the original FOIA in
1966.11 They believed that these records were adequately protected under
existing criminal discovery provisions. 12 Agency testimony convinced
them that disclosure of information from law enforcement investigations
might interfere with government prosecutions of offenders by giving par-
ties seeking disclosure earlier or greater access to information than existing
laws allowed. 13 The original exemption for law enforcement information
6. HousE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, SUBCOMM. ON GOV'T INFORMATION AND INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 94TH CONG.,
1ST SESS., FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND AMENDMENTS OF 1974 (P. L. 93-502), SOURCE BOOK:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER DOCUMENTS 285 (Joint Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited
as SOURCEBOOK].
7. Id. (statement of Senator Kennedy quoting then Chief Justice Warren); see also id. at 344
(remarks of Senator Weicker); 2 J. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE, ch. 17.07, at 17-14
(1984); Kennedy, Foreiward: Is the Pendulum Swinging Awayfrom Freedom of Information?, 16 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311, 311-12 (1981); Comment, The Freedom of Information Act: A Time for a
Change?, 1983 DET. C.L. REV. 171, 182; Note, Freedom of Information Act-Investigatory Records
Exemption-Summarized or Reproduced Information Retains Exemption, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1269.
1274-75 (1983).
8. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) provides that each agency shall make information available promptly
when a member of the public makes a proper request.
9. 2J. O'REILLY, supra note 7, ch. 17.04, at 17-18;see FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615,621(1982).
10. The exemptions to the general disclosure rule of the FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552, are listed in
subsection (b). The exemptions cover: (1) material classified as secret in the interest of national defense
or foreign policy; (2) material related solely to agency personnel rules and practices; (3) material
specifically exempted from disclosure by statute; (4) privileged or confidential trade secrets and com-
mercial or financial information obtained from a person; (5) inter-agency or intra-agency material
which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency; (6)
personnel, medical, or similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy; (7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, to the
extent that the production of such records would cause specific harms; (8) material related to the regula-
tion or supervision of financial institutions; and (9) certain geological and geophysical information.
Agencies must provide any reasonably segregable portion of a record after deleting the exempt
portions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982).
11. 2 J. O'REILLY, supra note 7, ch. 17.02, at 17-6.
12. Id., ch. 17.02, at 17-5.
13. Id.; SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 332.
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addressed this problem by exempting law enforcement investigatory files
except to the extent already available under prior law. 14
Courts interpreted this first law enforcement files exemption so broadly
that the exception threatened to swallow the rule of disclosure. 15 The label
"law enforcement" on a file became sufficient to justify withholding all of
the information in the file, regardless of whether disclosure would interfere
with law enforcement proceedings. 16 Under this "per se" interpretation of
exemption 7, the FOIA goal of promoting public scrutiny of government
conduct was seriously undermined. Proponents of open government feared
that less information was available under the 1966 Act than under previous
law. 17
Congress amended the law enforcement information exemption dras-
tically in 1974 to remedy these broad court interpretations. 18 The extensive
14. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7), Pub. L. No. 90-23, 80 Stat. 383 (1967) for the text of the original
exemption 7. The drafters had two main purposes: (1) to avoid expanding criminal discovery beyond
that allowed by the Jencks Act, Pub. L. No. 85-269, 71 Stat. 595 (1957) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3500
(1982)), and (2) to preserve NLRB discovery procedures. 2J. O'REiLLY, supra note7, ch. 17.02, at 17-6.
15. Agencies abused the law enforcement files exemption in two ways. First, agencies combined
exempt and nonexempt material in single files, which were then withheld. Second, agencies exempted
entire files as soon as they were characterized as "law enforcement." 2 J. O'REILLY, supra note 7, ch.
17.03, at 17-9.
16. A series of cases decided by the District of Columbia Circuit in the early 1970's adopted a per se
approach to the exemption. Note, supra note 7, at 1272-73 & n.19. This approach allowed agencies to
withhold information simply by stating that the requested record was compiled for law enforcement
purposes. If so, it was automatically exempt. It is particularly significant that the D.C. Circuit adopted
this approach because a great many FOIA suits are brought in that circuit. Id. at 1274 n.28, 1277.
17. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 333 (remarks of SenatorHart); see also 2 J. O'REILLY, supra note
7, ch. 17.03, at 17-11; Ellsworth, Amended Exemption 7 of the Freedom of Information Act, 25 AM.
U.L. REv. 37, 41 (1975) (noting a "gaping rift between judicial interpretation and congressional
intent"); Comment, The Freedom of Information Act: A Survey of Litigation Under the Exemptions, 48
Miss. L.J. 784, 812 (1977) ("mechanical, strictly literal test. . . violated both the spirit of the Act and
the specific intent of the exemption").
18. Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act, Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88
Stat. 1561 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970)). The "last straw" cases, decided by the D.C. Circuit in
1973 and 1974, strongly influenced Congress' decision to amend the FOIA. Note, Backdooring the
NLRB: Use and Abuse ofthe Amended FOIAfor Administrative Discovery, 8 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 145,
153-62 (1976); see also 2 J. O'REILLY, supra note 7, ch. 17.01, at 17-2, 17-12 (the exemption was
motivated by frustration with 1974 decisions).
Four cases particularly concerned Congress. In Weisberg v. United States Dep't of Justice, 489 F.2d
1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1974), the court held that files were exempt if they
were (1) investigatory and (2) compiled for law enforcement purposes. A congressman's request for a
report on the My Lai massacre was denied in Aspin v. Department of Defense, 491 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir.
1973), even though judicial proceedings were virtually concluded. In the third case, a consumer group
sought to compel disclosure of correspondence between auto manufacturers and the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration in connection with pending safety defect investigations. Ditlow v.
Brinegar, 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 974 (1974). In Ditlow, the
court upheld an agency denial despite the district court's conclusion that releasing the information
would not have caused any harm to the investigations. Finally, the court extended Weisberg to its outer
limits in Center for Nat'l Policy Review on Race & Urban Issues v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370, 372
(D.C. Cir. 1974), holding that a court need only inquire whether information was included in
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legislative history of the 1974 amendments indicates that Congress carefully
weighed policy issues in drafting the new version of exemption 7.19 Congress
was determined to narrow the scope of the exemption to prevent law enforce-
ment agencies and the courts from withholding information unnecessarily.20
To achieve this goal, Congress created a two-part test for exemption of inves-
tigatory records. First, the agency must show that a record is in fact investiga-
tory and compiled for law enforcement purposes. Second, the agency must
show that disclosure of the information will cause a specific harm. 21
Congress also recognized the need to adequately protect the identities of
law enforcement informers. 22 The 1974 amendments made the identities of
confidential sources exempt from disclosure under the FOIA. 23 Even where
the agency carefully deletes the names of sources, a person with knowledge
of the events investigated may be able to determine an informer's identity. 24
To provide additional protection for informers in criminal investigations,
Congress made both the identities of sources and any confidential informa-
tion given by confidential sources exempt. 25
Despite Congress' clear intent to narrow the scope of the law enforcment
files exemption through the 1974 amendments, federal courts of appeals
have disagreed on how to define the requirements for invoking exemption
7(D). Some circuits have created a presumption that information collected
by a criminal law enforcement agency is confidential, 26 while others
"investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes." Thus information collected in an
investigation by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare that was unlikely to lead to any
action need not be disclosed to a civil rights group. See also Note, Developments Under the Freedom of
Information Act-1977, 1978 DUKE L.J. 189, 217 & n. 183; Note, Freedom of Information Act
Exemption 7: A Postamendment Interpretation, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 202, 207 (1980).
19. See the extensive discussion of exemption 7 issues in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 284-475;
see also Antonelli v. FBI, 721 F.2d 615, 618 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2399 (1984).
20. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 332-45.
21. See 5U.S.C. § 552(b)(7); FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615,622 (1982); Ellsworth, supra note
17, at 45; Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1982, 1983 DUKE L.J.
390, 417.
22. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 229-30.
23. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (1982); see supra note 3 for text.
24. SoURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 340-43, 369-71; 2 J. O'REILLY, supra note 7, ch. 17.04, at 17-16
& ch. 17.10, at 17-47; Comment, FOIA Exemption 7 and Broader Disclosure of Unlawful FBI
Investigations, 65 MINN. L. REv. 1139, 1149 (1981).
In some instances, such as investigations of organized crime, an informer's life could be threatened if
his or her identity is revealed. Senator Hatch, a longtime critic of the FOIA, suggests that "the criminal
element, particularly organized crime, has learned to detect informant identities, and the status of
investigations by sifting through sensitive records obtained via F.O.I.A. requests." Hatch, Refinements
Are Needed to Stop Abuses, 69 A.B.A. J. 556,556 (1983). Potential informants may refuse to cooperate
with law enforcement agencies because of fear that their identities will be revealed in response to a
FOIA request, id.; see also SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 371.
25. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (1982); see supra note 3 for text.
26. See infra part IIA.
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FOIA
require an agency to affirmatively prove confidentiality. 27 One circuit has
held that an agency can invoke exemption 7(D) merely by stating that
information came from a confidential source with nothing more.28 The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently considered these divergent doc-
trines in Johnson v. United States Department of Justice.29
The facts of Johnson highlight the significance of the problem of defi-
ning the agency's burden. In Johnson, the FBI investigated Harold
Johnson concerning possible bank fraud and embezzlement. No charges
were brought against him. When Johnson sought disclosure of his file
under the FOIA, the FBI withheld much of the information, claiming that
exemption 7(D) for information from confidential sources applied.
Johnson sued in federal court to compel disclosure of the remaining
portions of his file. 30
The Justice Department filed a statement detailing the particular exemp-
tion that applied to each undisclosed portion of Johnson's file and moved for
summary judgment. The trial judge, unable to determine the applicability
of exemptions from the declaration, reviewed Johnson's entire file in
camera. The judge determined that the exemptions claimed by the FBI did
not apply and ordered the file disclosed. 31
The court of appeals reversed the trial court. At issue was the evidence
that must be shown before an agency can invoke exemption 7(D). 32 After
examining the approaches to this problem taken by other circuits, the court
held that a promise of confidentiality was implicit in all FBI criminal
investigations, unless evidence in the record indicated otherwise. 33 In so
holding, the court explicitly found that most people believe that informa-
tion given to the FBI will be kept confidential.34 The court held that the
sources contributing information to Johnson's file had been promised
confidentiality because the record presented no contrary evidence. Thus,
the FBI declaration was found sufficient to justify application of exemption
7(D). 35
27. See infra part IIB.
28. See infra part 11C.
29. 739 F.2d 1514 (10th Cir. 1984).
30. Id. at 1515-16.
31. Id. at 1515.
32. Id. at 1517.
33. Id. at 1518.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1519.
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II. DIFFERING APPROACHES TO THE AGENCY BURDEN
UNDER EXEMPTION 7(D)
A. Rebuttable Presumption of Confidentiality
In addition to the Tenth Circuit, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits also hold
that information provided during an investigation is presumptively
confidential, but evidence may be introduced to rebut this presumption. 36
These circuits find that the nature of a criminal law enforcement investiga-
tion itself implies confidentiality. 37 They also apply the rebuttable pre-
sumption approach in order to insure that informers will remain willing to
volunteer information. These circuits reason that allowing an agency to
invoke exemption 7(D) more freely will assure informers that they can
provide information without fear of disclosure.38
36. In Miller v. Bell, 661 F2d 623. 627 (7th Cir. 1981) (per curiam), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960
(1982), the Seventh Circuit specifically rejected the district court's requirement that the FBI show evi-
dence of express or implied promise of confidentiality. The court cited an earlier Seventh Circuit case
requiring that an agency show an express or implied promise of confidentiality, Maroscia v. Levi, 569
F.2d 1000 (7th Cir. 1977), to support a holding that FBI affidavits were sufficient. The affidavits in
Miller were not tested under the Maroscia standard, however, and the conflict between the two stan-
dards was not discussed. See also Scherer v. Kelley, 584 F.2d 170 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
964 (1979) (investigation for law enforcement purposes was held to imply promise of confidentiality).
In Ingle v. United States Dep't of Justice, 698 F.2d 259, 269 (6th Cir. 1983), the Sixth Circuit cited
Miller with approval, holding that the FBI need not prove a promise of confidentiality because such a
promise was inherently implicit in FBI interviews. A recent Sixth Circuit case, Osborn v. IRS, 754 F.2d
195 (6th Cir. 1985), indicates that the agency must still provide an index of the file, however. See infra
note 64 for a discussion of indices under the standard established by Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820
(D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
In a recent case, the Sixth Circuit confused the balancing test applied under FOIA exemption 7(C)
with the standard for determining when material should be protected under exemption 7(D). Kiraly v.
FBI, 728 F.2d 273 (6th Cir. 1984). Exemption 7(C) requires that courts use different standards than
when applying exemption 7(D). Because the issue at stake in exemption 7(C) is privacy, the court must
balance the interests of the public in having the information released against the privacy interest of the
individuals who might be harmed by releasing the information. See, e.g., Brown v. FBI, 658 F.2d 71,75
(2d Cir. 1981). However, a different policy underlies exemption 7(D). A confidential source's identity is
protected to further the public interest in law enforcement. Therefore, all information that meets the
criteria for exemption 7(D) is exempt, even if there is a strong public interest in releasing the
information. New England Apple Council v. Donovan, 725 F.2d 139, 145 (1st Cir. 1984); Lame v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 654 F.2d 917, 923 (3d Cir. 1981). But see Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d
998, 1002-03, 1005 (4th Cir. 1978) (approved balancing test for use in exemption 7(D)).
37. Miller v. Bell, 661 F.2d 623,627 (7th Cir. 1981) (percuriam), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 960 (1982).
The District of Columbia Circuit discussed the rebuttable presumption test in the context of the Privacy
Act exemption (k)(5), 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(5)(1982), in Londrigan v. FBI, 670 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir.
1981). The court held that it would not sanction a blanket assumption of confidentiality when the FBI
investigates a person's qualifications for federal employment. Id. at 1173. The court required the FBI to
produce more information than the affidavit of an agent who had not been involved in the interviews in
question when the affidavit asserted only a general assumption of confidentiality. Id, at 1172-73. The
Second Circuit limited Londrigan to qualifications investigations under the Privacy Act in Diamond v.
FBI. 707 F.2d 75, 78 (2d Cir. 1983) (FBI need not produce personal knowledge affidavits in cases
involving exemption 7(D)), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 995 (1984).
38. See, e.g., Kiral, 728 E2d at 278; Scherer, 584 F.2d at 176.
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Under the rebuttable presumption approach the agency can meet its
initial burden under exemption 7(D) by simply stating that the requested
information came from a confidential source. The agency need not show a
specific promise of confidentiality. Therefore, the agency can easily with-
hold information.
To rebut the presumption of confidentiality, the party seeking disclosure
must show that sources received no express or implied promise of con-
fidentiality. It will often be impossible to refute the agency's claim of
confidentiality, however, because details of the circumstances surrounding
the collection of the information are in the agency's hands. 39 It would be
particularly difficult if the agency, instead of the source, had some purpose
in not disclosing the requested information. 40
The rebuttable presumption approach is particularly disturbing given the
procedure used by the FBI to determine whether to invoke an exemption.
The Bureau assumes that all information it receives is to be kept con-
fidential. It automatically uses the confidential source exemption to with-
hold information unless it has a notarized authorization for release from the
source on file. 4 1
B. Agency Must Prove an Express or Implied Assurance of
Confidentiality
The rebuttable presumption approach is not universally followed. Other
circuits that have considered the confidential source issue hold that the
agency must demonstrate an express or implied promise of confidentiality
in order to invoke exemption 7(D). The District of Columbia,42 First,43
39. Poss v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1977), is a rare example of a case where ajudge decided
on the basis of the agency affidavit alone that no guarantee of confidentiality had been given. In Poss,
NLRB witnesses knew that they might be called to testify at trial. Id. at 658.
40. For example, an agency might be reluctant to disclose information exposing illegal investiga-
tions or revealing administrative blunders.
41. Lame v. United States Dep't of Justice, 654 F.2d 917, 925 (3d Cir. 1981).
42. Lykins v. United States Dep't of Justice, 725 F.2d 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1984), held that an agency
must supply affidavits to support claims of exemption and may not justify withholding on the basis of
sweeping or conclusory statements.
The Tenth Circuit in Johnson v. United States Dep't of Justice, 739 F.2d 1514, 1517 (10th Cir. 1984),
erroneously categorized the D.C. Circuit as having adopted the per se approach, see infra part IIC,
based upon the legislative history cited in Lesar v. United States Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472 (D.C.
Cir. 1980). See infra note 60 for a discussion of the relevant legislative history. The major issue in Lesar
was whether a local law enforcement agency could be a confidential source. Lesar, 636 F 2d at 489-91.
The Lesar court also considered the sufficiency of the agency's affidavits for purposes of invoking
exemption 7(D). Id. at 491-92. The court quoted from the legislative history of the 1974 amendments,
noting that an express or implied promise of confidentiality was required to invoke exemption 7(D). Id.
Furthermore, the court in Lesar found that an explicit promise of confidentiality had been given. Id.
43. Crooker v. United States Parole Comm'n, 730 F.2d 1, 10 (Ist Cir. 1984) (criminal law
enforcement), vacated on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 317 (1984); New England Apple Council v.
Donovan, 725 F.2d 139, 145 (Ist Cir. 1984) (civil law enforcement).
879
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Second,44 Fourth, 45 Ninth, 46 and Eleventh47 Circuits have adopted this
test.48 These courts rely on the legislative history of the 1974 amendments
to determine the agency burden. To meet that burden, the agency must
show that a "person provided information under an express assurance of
confidentiality or in circumstances from which such an assurance could be
reasonably inferred. ,49
Putting the burden on the agency to demonstrate confidentiality properly
focuses attention on the circumstances under which the information was
obtained rather than upon the contents of the document. 50 The test requires
agencies to explain the circumstances under which information was given.
The agency must describe these circumstances with sufficient detail to
enable a court to find that a promise of confidentiality was either explicitly
or implicitly given. 51 Usually, the agency can meet this burden by submit-
ting affidavits from the agents who collected the information. 52 The agency
44. Keeney v. FBI, 630 F.2d 114, 119-20 (2d Cir. 1980).
45. Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998, 1002-03, 1005 (4th Cir. 1978). In this case, the court
confused exemption 7(C) and 7(D), and applied an inappropriate balancing of the public interest in
disclosure against the public interest in protecting informants. Id. at 1002. The court, however, placed
the burden of proving confidentiality on the agency. Id. at 1003. For an analysis of the distinctions
between exemptions 7(C) and 7(D), see New England Apple Council, 725 F.2d at 145:
Exemption 7(D) provides greater protection to a narrower class of persons than does 7(C). To
invoke 7(D), the government must show that the informant provided information to government
officials under an express or implied assurance of confidentiality. If the government can make this
showing, it need not then demonstrate, as it must under 7(C), that privacy interests outweigh the
public interest in disclosure.
46. Van Bourg, Allen, Weinberg & Roger v. NLRB, 751 F.2d 982, 986 (9th Cir. 1985).
47. L & C Marine Transport Ltd. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 740 F2d 919,923-24 (11th Cir.
1984).
48. The Fifth Circuit has not explicitly adopted a test for the confidential source exemption.
However, a 1979 case involving disclosure of IRS records allowed exemption from disclosure when an
in camera examination revealed that the IRS had received information under an implied promise of
confidentiality. Pope v. United States, 599 F.2d 1383, 1386-87 (5th Cir. 1979).
49. Lesar, 636 F.2d at 490; Nix, 572 F.2d at 1003 n.5; see also Crooker 730 F.2d at 10; Keeney, 630
F.2d at 119-20.
50. Shaw v. FBI, 749 F.2d 58, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citing Weisberg v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 745 F.2d 1476, 1492 (D.C. Cir. 1984) and Lesar, 636 E2d at 492). The court in Shaw
specifically addressed the issue of whether "public" information from a confidential source could be
confidential information for the purposes of the FOIA and held that "confidential information" referred
to the nature of the agreement between the source and the agency, not to whether the information was
available elsewhere. Id.
51. Lame v. United States Dep't of Justice, 654 F.2d 917, 928 (3d Cir. 1981).
52. Affidavits from agents indicating that sources expected confidentiality are usually sufficient to
satisfy the burden of proof for the agency. See, e.g., Parton v. United States Dep't of Justice, 727 F.2d
774, 776 (8th Cir. 1984); Lesar, 636 F.2d at 491; Maroscia v. Levi, 569 F2d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir. 1977).
A dissent by Justice Wilkey in Baez v. United States Dep't of Justice, 647 F.2d 1328 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
suggested that agency affidavits may not be sufficient if bad faith by the agency is an issue. Id. at 1341
(Wilkey, J., dissenting).
FOIA
affidavits and explanations can. be reviewed in camera if necessary to
protect a confidential source's identity.53
C. Agency Assertion of Confidentiality Invokes Exemption Per Se
Initially, the Third Circuit placed the burden on the agency to prove that a
source gave information with an expectation of confidentiality. In Lame v.
United States Department of Justice,54 it held that an affidavit from an FBI
agent stating that the Bureau assumes sources want information to be kept
confidential was not sufficient to invoke exemption 7(D).55 One year later,
however, the court implicitly overruled Lame by approving a district court
holding that an agency need only state that information came from a
confidential source to invoke the exemption. 56
This per se approach to exemption 7(D) ignores the plain language of the
1974 amendments and collides with congressional intent to prevent an
agency from invokng FOIA exemptions by merely "rubber stamping"
documents. 57 Both Congress and the courts in other circuits have condemned
such mechanical applications of the FOIA. 58 Moreover, the approach of the
Third Circuit does not preserve a right of the party seeking disclosure to
present evidence that the source is not confidential. The Third Circuit
holding, reaching much further than necessary,59 represents a serious
departure from the FOIA policy of broad disclosure. 60
53. See, e.g., Lykins v. United States Dep't of Justice, 725 F.2d 1455, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Parton, 727 F.2d at 776.
54. 654 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1981).
55. Id. at 927; see also id. at 924 n.7 (noting that Senator Hart's statement that all the FBI needs to
do is state that information came from a confidential source and it is exempt does not mean that courts
must automatically defer to FBI characterizations of information).
56. Conoco Inc. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 687 F.2d 724, 730 (3d Cir. 1982). The court
stated that there is no requirement that the agency show a promise or an agreement on the agency's part
to hold the information provided by a source in confidence. All the agency must do is state that the
information was furnished by a confidential source and identify the document. To require more detail
would greatly increase the possibility that the source and content of the confidential correspondence
would be revealed. Id.
57. SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 344.
58. E.g., Lykins, 725 F.2d at 1463; Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974); SOuRCEdOOK, supra note 6, at 304 (remarks of Senator Muskie); id. at
335-36 (remarks of Senator Kennedy).
59. The broad holding in Conoco was not needed to decide the case. The affidavits provided by the
government "sufficiently detail[ed] the confidential nature of both documents." Conoco, 687 F.2d at
730. In fact, the Third Circuit's result is contrary to language in the opinion that states that conclusory
statements are not sufficient to meet the government burden of proof under the FOIA. Id. at 728.
60. There is some support for the per se approach in the legislative history of the 1974 amendments.
The sponsor of the investigatory records amendment, Senator Philip Hart, urged senators to override a
presidential veto of the amendments. He pointed out that President Ford's objections to the
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D. Different Tests for Civil and Criminal Law Enforcement Agencies
The Eighth Circuit has not consistently applied one standard to deter-
mine whether agencies have adequately justified application of exemption
7(D). The circuit appears to distinguish between civil and criminal law
enforcement agencies. Civil agencies such as the NLRB must affirmatively
prove the expectation of confidentiality, 6 1 while a mere assertion of con-
fidentiality is probably adequate for the FBI. 62
III. A UNIFORM APPROACH
The federal courts of appeals should adopt a single, uniform approach to
the agency's burden under exemption 7(D). The rights of a party seeking
disclosure under the FOIA should be the same in all federal courts.
Considering the purposes of the FOIA and the legislative history of the
1974 amendments, placing the burden on the agency is the only approach
consistent with congressional intent. Courts should require an agency to
prove an express or implied promise of confidentiality in order to invoke
exemption 7(D).
The traditional adversarial system is seriously distorted in FOIA dis-
putes. 63 The party seeking disclosure does not know the contents of the
investigatory records amendment had already been taken into account in drafting a House-Senate
compromise bill. 120 CONG. REC. 36,871 (1974), reprinted in SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 451. To
answer President Ford's concern that identities of informers would be exposed, Senator Hart noted that
the amendments provided extensive protection for confidential sources. He stated that all information
from confidential sources in a criminal investigation was exempt and concluded that all the FBI had to
do was "state that information was furnished by a confidential source and it is exempt." Id.
Despite Senator Hart's comment, the per se approach is not consistent with the weight of the
legislative history of the 1974 amendments. Elsewhere in the record, Senator Hart made clear the
importance of placing on the agency the burden of justifying the application of exemptions.
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 333. He emphasized that conclusory statements do not satisfy this
burden. Id. It would have surprised and displeased Senator Hart to learn that an isolated remark had
become ajudicial test. Given the remainder of the legislative history, he probably meant to say "all the
FBI has to do is prove that the information came from a confidential source and it is exempt."
61. Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d 1131, 1137 (4th Cir. 1977).
62. Parton v. United States Dep't of Justice, 727 F.2d 774, 776 (8th Cir. 1984). The court cited
Senator Hart's statement that all the FBI must do is state that information came from a confidential
source and it is exempt. See supra note 60. This application of the legislative history is overly narrow.
See supra note 60. The court went on to find that an FBI affidavit clearly showing that a promise of
confidentiality could be implied under the circumstances was sufficient to warrant exemption. Parton,
727 F.2d at 776.
63. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974), was one of
the first cases to reject an agency's attempt to shift the burden of proof to the plaintiff or the court on this
ground. See Comment, Freedom ofInformation: Judicial Review of Executive Security Classifications,
28 U. FLA. L. REV. 551,556-57 (1976); Lively, Catch 7(A): The Plaintiff's Burden Under the Freedom
of Information Act, 28 VILL. L. REv. 75, 76-77 (1982-83) (plaintiff normally at great disadvantage in
FOIA suits).
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documents sought or the circumstances under which the documents were
prepared. Thus, the party most interested in disclosure has no information
to challenge government claims of exemption. Only the agency opposing
disclosure has access to the information that might be used to compel
disclosure.64 Congress, recognizing the predicament of the party seeking
disclosure, placed the burden of justifying the applicability of claimed
exemptions on the agency. 65
The Supreme Court has stressed the importance of attention to legis-
lative history in determining congressional intent when interpreting the
FOIA. 66 The 1974 amendments were an unmistakable message from
Congress to the courts: interpret FOIA exemptions narrowly and favor
disclosure over secrecy. The purpose of the amendments was to insure that
all information requested under the FOIA would be disclosed unless the
agency could prove that the information fell within one of a few narrow
exemptions. 67
In 1974 Congress entirely rewrote the law enforcement files exemption;
the exemption's scope was narrowed and its coverage confined to cases in
which the government could prove that disclosure would cause harm. 68
Allowing an automatic exemption for requested information on the basis of
a presumption or an agency assertion that the information came from a
confidential source is directly contrary to the scheme of the 1974 amend-
ments. On the other hand, placing the burden on the agency to prove a
promise of confidentiality accords with congressional intent in requiring
the agency to comply with the FOIA requirement of demonstrating that an
exemption applies.
Supreme Court interpretations of other FOIA exemptions can provide
guidance for interpreting exemption 7(D). For example, exemption 7(A),
which prevents the release of information that would interfere with law
enforcement proceedings, was considered recently by the Supreme
Court. 69 The Court held that the exemption did not require the NLRB to
make specific, case-by-case findings of interference, but rather that generic
64. Vaughn, 484 F.2d at 823-24. The court held that an agency should prepare a specific index for
documents and portions of documents exempted, correlating the documents and the government's
reasons forrefusing to disclose. Id. at 827. This itemized index would help the trial judge determine the
applicability of exemptions. Where necessary, the court could examine some or all of the documents in
camera as well. Id. at 823. Other circuits now require a Vaughn Index or similar document from the
agency to justify application of an exemption.
65. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (1982).
66. In interpreting the FOIA, the Supreme Court has examined congressional intent as expressed in
the legislative history of the Act. See, e.g., NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 224
(1978); FAA Adm'r v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255, 262 (1975); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 81 (1973).
67. 2 J. O'RILLY, supra note 7, ch. 17.03, at 17-9 n.2; Note, supra note 7, at 1272 n.18.
68. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
69. Robbins Tire, 437 U.S. at 214.
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determinations could be made based on the type of document requested. 70
In reaching this decision, however, the Court, in dicta, contrasted exemp-
tion 7(A) with other exemptions including 7(D). The Court noted that for
these other exemptions, the statutory language referring to particular cases
indicated that factors made relevant by the statute must be present in each
individual situation before the exemption can be applied. 71
The Supreme Court has granted great deference to agency classification
of documents related to national security under exemption 1.72 In the case
of investigatory records, however, this deference is not appropriate. Classi-
fication of national security information involves an exercise of admin-
istrative judgment. Congress specifically indicated that agencies should
have discretion to determine whether information has national security
implications. 73 In contrast, a determination that information came from a
confidential source involves a question of fact concerning the circum-
stances under which the information was collected. There is no reason for
courts to defer in this determination to the agency. No special discretion has
been granted to the agency to decide such questions.
A recent Supreme Court decision under exemption 3 also indicates that
courts should not allow an agency to withhold information under exemp-
tion 7(D) without adequate justification. In CIA v. Sims, 7 4 the Court
considered whether the CIA could withhold information under FOIA
exemption 3, which provides that an agency need not disclose matters
specifically protected by statute. 75 The Court decided that section
102(d)(3) of the National Security Act of 1947 qualified as a withholding
statute under exemption 3.76 The Court examined the legislative history of
section 102(d)(3) to determine the degree of discretion granted to the
agency under the statute to categorize information as coming from an
"intelligence source," and found that the agency had great discretion. 77 In
making this determination, the Court contrasted the term "intelligence
source" with the term "confidential source" as used in exemption 7(D). It
70. Id. at 224-25.
71. Id. at 224.
72. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
73. ld. at 81-84.
74. 105 S. Ct. 1881 (1985).
75. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1982).
76. Sims, 105 S. Ct. at 1887.
77. Id. at 1887-88.
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noted that "confidential source" was a much narrower category of pro-
tected information sources. 78 The concurring opinion found that "intel-
ligence source" should receive the same treatment in the courts as "con-
fidential source": the information should be exempted when given under an
explicit or implicit assurance of confidentiality.79
Critics of the FOIA policy of releasing most law enforcement records
have pointed to instances where organized crime has used the FOIA to
discover informers' identities. 80 They believe that the FOIA creates a
perception among informers that their confidentiality is no longer pro-
tected. These critics fear that this perception will hamper law enforcement.
They assert that the FOIA "dries up" information by making informers less
likely to come forward. Yet no agency has presented evidence that fewer
people are willing to volunteer information in the circuits that require an
agency to prove confidentiality to invoke exemption 7(D).
Adoption of a uniform standard requiring agencies to prove a promise of
confidentiality would not endanger confidential sources of law enforcement
information. The test used to prove the application of exemption 7(D) does
not affect the protection of legitimate confidential sources. Placing the
burden on the agency to prove confidentiality will not require law enforce-
ment agencies to release more or less information from truly confidential
sources than previously released. It will only make the agency invoking the
exemption comply with FOIA requirements to prove that the exemption
applies. The agency must indicate the reasons why the exemption applies to
legitimately withhold information.
Requiring the agency to prove confidentiality does not place an excessive
burden on law enforcement. 8' The agency has all of the information about
the circumstances surrounding the collection of the information easily
available; it is in the best position to present this evidence. It is unlikely that
the government would be unable to demonstrate an express or implied
promise of confidentiality in any legitimate case. Furthermore, if the
78. Id. n.13.
79. Id. at 1896.
80. 2 J. O'R ALLY, supra note 7, ch. 17.01, at 17-4; Hatch, supra note 24, at 556.
81. Even if placing the burden on the agency significantly increased the agency's administrative
workload, this would not justify refusing to comply with the FOIA. Congress overrode President Ford's
veto of the 1974 amendments despite the President's concern with increased administrative burdens.
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 6, at 541-42; see also Ellsworth, supra note 17, at 39 & n. 10; Note, supra note
21, at 419; Note, The Title Guarantee Theory and Related Decisions: Are the Courts Interfering With
Exemption 7 of the FOIA?, 23 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 275, 297-98 (1977) (quoting Senator Weicker).
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agency cannot show an express or implied promise of confidentiality, other
FOIA exemptions may justify nondisclosure. 82
The concern expressed by some courts that information given to law
enforcement agencies should be presumed to be confidential because most
people expect confidentiality is similarly unconvincing. The FOIA encour-
ages close judicial scrutiny of agency determinations, not judicial defer-
ence based on generalizations. The best way to achieve the FOIA goal of
maximum disclosure is to reveal the circumstances under which the re-
quested information was collected and let the trial judge decide the issue.
When the agency can demonstrate circumstances showing that a promise of
confidentiality should be implied, courts will support agency withholding
of information. If the circumstances surrounding the collection of the
information do not convince the trial judge that the source could reasonably
expect confidentiality, the information should not be withheld.
An additional benefit of requiring detailed explanations from law en-
forcement agencies is that this will encourage agencies to exercise greater
care. This may make agencies less likely to release information erro-
neously. The agency knows that the trial judge will review the material
submitted to support an assertion of exemption 7(D) and may choose to
examine the documents in camera. 83 The agency will therefore be careful to
justify adequately its decision to withhold. Both the public interest in
agency accountability and the private interest of the party seeking dis-
closure are served by requiring adequate explanations for invoking FOIA
exemptions.
Requiring an agency to prove an express or implied promise of con-
fidentiality might not thwart a determined agency coverup, but it will
encourage agency honesty. The more difficult it is to cover up, the less
likely it is that agency improprieties can be explained as carelessness or
error. It is much easier to conceal information when it simply can be
stamped "confidential" than when the agency must submit affidavits
describing the circumstances surrounding the collection of the information
and prepare a detailed index for judicial review. Requiring the agency to
justify nondisclosure with evidence, not mere assertions, is the only way to
achieve the FOIA goal of open government.
82. For example, exemption 7 also protects investigatory records compiled for law enforcement
purposes when disclosure: (1) interferes with enforcement proceedings, (2) denies a person's right to a
fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (3) unwarrantedly invades personal privacy, (4) reveals inves-
tigative techniques and procedures, or (5) threatens the life or physical safety of law enforcement
personnel. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1982).
83. The prospect of justifying its decision to a judge may cause an agency to be more thorough and
objective. Stein v. United States Dep't of Justice, 662 F.2d 1245, 1254 (7th Cir. 1981).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The courts of appeals should adopt a uniform approach to exemption
7(D) of the FOIA. A requirement that an agency must prove that informa-
tion came from a confidential source to invoke the exemption is the best
approach. Requiring that the agency show an express or implied promise of
confidentiality is consistent with the purpose and legislative history of the
FOIA. This requirement is fair to both the agency and the party seeking
disclosure, because the agency is uniquely able to produce this informa-
tion.
Judith A. Bigelow
